Middle East 2030-the Spring of Democracy?

Where are we today, 20 years after the fall of the Soviet Union, in terms of the democratic reform process and democratic development (human rights, civil society, electoral democracy) of the Middle East ? Where is the Middle East heading on, 20 years from now? Is there any relationship between promoting democracy and a a more peaceful and stable Middle East ? Shadi Hamid, a regional expert from Middle East has answered to all these questions for

Autocracy is not and cannot be a permanent solution – and there is little reason to think that the Middle East is somehow an exception to history. Rather, the region’s lack of democracy is a function of clearly discernible factors, many of them external. Western powers have worked, rather consistently, to undermine democratic movements in the region, the most obvious example being the CIA-sponsored coup that toppled the Mossadegh government in Iran. Today, the United States continues to financially and militarily support the region’s most repressive regimes to the tune of billions of dollars per year. Egypt has long been the second-largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance while Jordan is the second-largest per-capita recipient. This despite the fact that both countries have become considerably less open and more repressive over the last 20 years. The Islamist opposition in Egypt is currently experiencing the worst wave of government repression since the days of Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1960s. Since 2006, the Mubarak regime has embarked on a systematic campaign to erase the Muslim Brotherhood from the political map and is doing so with few objections from the United States and European Union. It is odd that Western policymakers insist on asking why the region is so thoroughly autocratic while simultaneously authorizing the funding that ensures the persistence of such an outcome.

An Arab Spring
The region will see greater political openness only if the United States makes a strategic commitment to support democratization. Whether it does or not is anyone’s guess. But there is little doubt the U.S can play a decisive role if it chooses to, as it did in 2004 and 2005 when the Bush administration began exerting serious pressure on Arab allies to reform. It may be difficult to remember it now, but the “Arab spring” was something both real and unprecedented. Egypt for instance saw its greatest ever mass-mobilization in favor of democracy, with over 150,000 participating in protests, rallies, and campaign events. A little pressure can go a long way. 
As for what the region might look like in the future, some are betting on the decline of Islamist influence. But while the popularity of Islamist groups might seem to have peaked, there is little reason to believe that an Islamist present will give way to a secular future. It is also far from clear what such a future would even look like, considering that secular and liberal groups are the weakest they’ve ever been in much of the region (even in Jordan, one of the most supposedly Westernized Arab countries, secular parties can claim a grand total of 0 seats out of 110 in parliament). To the extent that citizens will look beyond both regimes and the Islamist opposition, they will probably gravitate toward informal politics, which could mean anything from joining extremist groups, to forgetting about politics and focusing on education and social services, to engaging in organic protest movements.

The myth of generous autocracy
Where there might be more promise is on the economic reform front. The Dubai-Singapore model of indefinitely postponing political reform in favor of economic growth threatens to become the dominant paradigm among the ruling regimes of the region. Tunisia is hailed as a success story in this regard, at the price of the complete destruction of political opposition and an independent civil society. In Egypt, Jordan, and a number of other countries, Western-educated technocrats have come to play a more prominent role at the highest levels of government. Their Western educations and lifestyles have not apparently extended to an appreciation of political liberty. That Dubai is sinking (at least for now) is not something to be welcomed, but perhaps the piercing of the myth of benevolent-autocratic-economic growth may force imitators to reconsider their strategies. Benevolent autocrats are great when they’re successful, less so when they’re failing – and no mechanisms for accountability exist to check the abuse and misuse of power.

A powder keg
In asking the question of whether democracy will contribute to stability in the Middle East, it is worth asking the question of what more than five decades of Western support of authoritarian governments has led to. It has produced a region uniquely consumed by religious extremism, political violence, and the perpetuation of regimes that may appear stable but otherwise can claim little legitimacy in the eyes of their own people. This is also a region characterized by untold economic failures, rising income inequality, massive unemployment, crumbling educational systems, and so on. This is not the picture of a peaceful and more stable Middle East. Rather, it is the picture of a region falling apart at the seams. The Middle East is a powder keg. And for those who speak of the stability of Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia, it is best to recall the lessons of Iran in the late 1970s: regimes are usually stable – until they’re not. And then it’s too late.
A number of empirical studies – by Alan Krueger, Jitka Maleckova, Alberto Abadie, among others – have suggested a correlation between lack of democracy and a greater incidence of terrorist activity. Interestingly, a 2005 Freedom House noted that “between 1999 and 2003, 70 percent of all deaths from terrorism were caused by terrorists and terrorist groups originating in Not Free societies, while only 8 percent of all fatalities were generated by terrorists and terror movements with origins in Free societies.”  
This makes sense on an intuitive level. If Arab citizens lack peaceful, political outlets with which to express their grievances, then they are more likely to resort to extralegal – even violent – outlets for communicating those grievances. Blocking freedom of expression and political activity is a surefire way to drive dissent underground. And once underground, dissent is more likely to emerge in bursts of violence.
If we wish to trace the origins of modern-day terrorism, we would be well-advised to look, first, to Gamal Abdel Nasser’s dungeons, where thousands of Islamists were imprisoned, tortured, and sometimes executed over the course of the 1950s and 60s. In the prisons, a well-documented process of radicalization took place. The most well-known example is that of the so-called “godfather of modern terrorism,” Sayyid Qutb, who during his long tenure in prison gradually came to take on progressively more radical views. Torture has a way of radicalizing its targets and the emotional scars rarely ever heal.

Shadi Hamid is Deputy Director of the Brookings Doha Center. His expertise is focused on Arab politics, democratization in the Middle East and US democracy promotion policy